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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Price Regulation-Rationale of "Affected
With a Public Interest"
The United States Supreme Court in Olsen v. Nebraska- swept
away the remaining vestige of the confusing notion that legislative price
fixing could only be exercised in businesses found by the Court to be
"affected with a public interest". The Court upheld, against an attack
founded on the due process clause, a Nebraska statute which provided
that no licensed employment agency should collect from an applicant,
as compensation for its services, more than the aggregate of a stated
registration fee and 10% of the first month's wages. 2  The Supreme
Court of Nebraska had held this legislation unconstitutional, 3 basing
their decision on Ribnik v. McBride,4 in which case the United States
Supreme Court had declared a similar New Jersey statute invalid. How-
ever, in the instant case, the Court, in reversing the state court, un-
equivocally stated,5 (1) that the Ribnik case had been overruled by
more recent decisions; (2) "that the phrase 'affected with a public
interest' can mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason,
is subject to control for the public good", and (3) that the wisdom,
need and appropriateness of such legislation "should be left where it
was left by the Constitution-to the states and to Congress".
The power to regulate business or economic activity for the general
welfare is inherent in any government. This regulatory power, known
as the police power, justifies the regulation of private enterprise when
necessary for the protection and promotion of the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare. The Fifth Amendment, controlling federal
action, and the Fourteenth, controlling state action, serve as limits for
the exercise of the police power. They confine the exercise of the
police power to its proper ends and insure that the ends shall be accom-
plished by methods consistent with due process. In determining whether
price-fixing regulation. was within the objectives of the police power0
'61 Sup. Ct. 862, 85 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 820 (1941).
'NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) §§48-508.
'State v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 574, 293 S. W. 393 (1940).
'277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. ed. 913 (1927).
'Olsen v. Nebraska, 61 Sup. Ct. 862, 865, 85 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 820, 824
(1941).
' It is not within the scope of this note to discuss those instances where price
regulations have been upheld on some basis other than the conclusion that the
business involved was "affected with a public interest", e.g., Margolin v. United
States, 269 U. S. 93, 46 Sup. Ct. 64, 70 L. ed. 176 (1925), upholding statute
limiting amount chargeable by attorneys prosecuting various claims against the
United States; and Griffith v. State of Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 31 Sup. Ct.
132, 54 L. ed. 1151 (1910), sustaining a state usury statute.
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the courts until recently treated the right of the owner of property to
fix the price at which his property could be sold or used as an inherent
attribute of the property itself.7 Accordingly some special circumstances
had to exist in order to justify price regulation under the police power.
Commonly where the regulation was upheld the Court drew from the
circumstances the conclusion that the business was "affected with a pub-
lic interest"." No such conclusion was necessary in order to justify
many other types of police regulation; for example, health regulations
could be visited upon enterprises whether or not they were "affected
with a public interest".9 However, health regulation is used to attack
health problems. Hitherto it was thought that price regulation was
supportable only where there were special price problems. The judicial
requirement that a business be "affected with a public interest", i.e., be
in a special category, before price regulation was justified, was the
judicial counterpart of the economic doctrine of laissez faire. The eco-
nomic system was founded on free enterprise; price regulation was an
exception requiring justification.
Looking solely to the phraseology of the courts the term "'affected
with a public interest"' 0 eludes the grasp. The Supreme Court, by Mr.
Justice Sutherland, conceded that it was undefined and indefinite." Its
actual effect can best be understood, so far as price legislation is con-
cerned, by examining the situations in which the Court found the enter-
Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 429, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. ed. 718, 722
(1927).
' German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612,
58 L. ed. 1011 (1914); Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468, 36
L. ed. 247 (1892) ; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77 (1876).
Maryland v. Hyman, 98 Md. 596, 57 Atl. 6 (1904) (a statute prescribing at
least 400 cubic feet of air for each employee in manufacturing establishments
was upheld) ; People v. Smith, 108 Mich. 527, 66 N. W. 382 (1896) (statute
requiring blowers to carry dust from emery wheels).
" This phrase originated in Lord Hale's essay De Portibus Maris written
in 1670. Discussing the common law duty to charge reasonable prices imposed
on owners of wharves to which all must come, he remarked that, "When private
property is 'affected with a public interest' it ceases to be juris privati only".
In attempting to clarify its distinction between those businesses subject to price
regulation and those not so subject the Court in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 133,
24 L. ed. 77 (1876), referred to Lord Hale's essay and concluded that prices
could be regulated when a business was "affected with a public interest". How-
ever, it did not clearly decide whether the classification would be left to the
legislature or to the court; subsequent cases held that the court should make this
decision. In Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262
U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. ed. 1103 (1923), the Court limited businesses
"affected with a public interest" to three categories: (1) Where a franchise
had been granted, with an affirmative duty of rendering public service. (2)
Occupations long subject to exceptional regulations, such as innkeepers and
cabmen. (3) Those businesses, not public at their inception, which have come
to bear such a peculiar relation to the public that they can be said to have
been devoted by their owners to a public use, in effect granting the public an
interest in that use, and subject to regulation to the extent of that use.
" Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 430, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. ed. 718, 722
(1927).
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prises involved to be so affected. An examination of the decisions in
which the "affected with public interest" doctrine has been applied, and
the price regulation upheld, discloses that the element common to all
is the existence of a situation or a combination of circumstances mate-
rially impairing the regulative force of competition to the extent that
serious economic consequences resulted to a very large number of the
community.
The decision in Munn v. Illinois'2 is dearly explainable on the above
basis. There the Court was asked to review an Illinois statute which
fixed the maximum price for storage in grain elevators in Chicago. In
deciding that the grain elevators were "affected with a public interest"
the Court found that because of their strategic location between rail
traffic from the interior states and water traffic to the consumer world,
these elevators stood in the "gateway of commerce". It also found that
the owners had taken advantage of this strategic position and had
formulated a single-price schedule which was followed by all, thereby
creating a "virtual monopoly" affecting the whole wheat-producing mid-
dle west. Thus it was apparent to the Court that the competitive system
had broken down and that prices were no longer regulated by the law
of supply and demand. Consequently, because of this combination of
circumstances a business, private at its inception, had become "affected
with a public interest".
Subsequent cases in which price regulations have been upheld on
the "affected with public interest" theory have presented situations in
which the basic economic facts were the same as above, i.e., there had
been a breakdown of the competitive price-fixing system in a business
which affected the community as a whole. Thus a Kansas statute fixing
the rates of fire insurance companies was upheld.' 3 The facts were
that there was an almost universal need for insurance protection, and
that while the insurers competed for the business they all 'fixed their
premiums for similar risks according to an agreed schedule of rates.
Similar economic situations were presented in those cases where
price fixing was upheld because some emergency had caused the law of
supply and demand to become inoperative as a price regulator.14 In
1294 U. S. 133, 24 L. ed. 77 (1876).
" German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612,
58 L. ed. 1011 (1914). This decision was subsequently used as the basis for up-
holding a New Jersey statute fixing the commission of insurance agents. O'Gorman
and Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,. 282 U. S. 251, 51 Sup. Ct. 130, 75
L. ed. 324 (1930). It was also followed in LaTourteet v. McMaster, 248 U. S.
465, 39 Sup. Ct. 160,, 63 L. ed. 362 (1918) (where regulation of the relation of
those engaged in the insurance business was allowed).
14 War emergency rent statutes were upheld in: Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair,
264 U. S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405, 68 L. ed. 841 (1924) ; Marcus Brown Holding Co.
v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65 L. ed. 877 (1921) ; Block v.
Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. ed. 865 (1921).
Highland v. Russell Car and Snowplow Co., 279 U. S. 253, 49 Sup. Ct. 314, 73
1941]
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Block v. Hirsch,15 the first of a series of war emergency rent cases, the
power of Congress to fix rents was upheld in the presence of an abnor-
mal demand and a limited supply of housing facilities.
On the other hand, certain cases are apparently inconsistent with
the above-mentioned rationale. Brass v. Stoeser 8 involved a North
Dakota statute regulating charges of some six hundred grain elevators
scattered along lines of railroad throughout a sparsely populated region.
There was no strangling monopoly and no indication that the regulative
power of competition had broken down, yet the legislation was upheld.
This can be defended on the basis that when a business is found to be
affected with a public interest all units of it are to be put in the same
classification though some of them lack the distinguishing characteristics
which originally had been used to justify the classification. Grain
elevators had already been held subject to price regulation in the Munt
case. But in Ribnik v. McBrideT the Court failed to declare a public
interest in a case involving the requisite economic factors. In that case
a six-to-three decision declared unconstitutional a New Jersey statute
fixing the maximum fees chargeable by employment agencies. 18 In this
business also the price control could have been justified on the ground
that free competition failed to fix prices adequately because in practice
the agencies took advantage of the unequal bargaining power of the
unemployed.
Comparison of the Brass and Ribnik cases discloses the unsatisfac-
tory operation of the "affected with a public interest" test. In the first
case price regulation was supported where there was complete freedom
of competition and little apparent need for regulation; in the second,
regulation was invalidated in spite of the exceptional need for it.
Gradually various members of the Court became dissatisfied with
the old concept, as is evidenced by the presence in some of the more
recent decisions of vigorous dissents. Criticizing the majority in Tyson
v. Banton 9 Justice Holmes was of the opinion that "the notion that a
business is clothed with a public interest and has been devoted to a
public use" was "little more than a fiction intended to beautify what is
L. ed. 688 (1928) (emergency regulation of coal prices was sustained) ; Wilson
v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L. ed. 755 (1916) (federal emergency
wage regulation was upheld).
"256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. ed. 865 (1921).
"153 U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857, 38 L. ed. 757 (1894).
27277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. ed. 913 (1927).
" LAws OF NEW JERSEY (1918) c. 277, p. 822.
273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. ed. 718 (1927) (the Court was asked
to pass on the validity of a New York statute limiting the resale price of theatre
tickets by ticket brokers. It was held that the theatre business was essentially
private in nature and therefore was not subject to price regulation; by treating
the theatre ticket brokers as an appendage of the theatre business it necessarily
followed that their charges could not be regulated).
[Vol. 20
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disagreeable to the sufferers", and further that "the proper course is to
recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless
it is restrained by some express prohibition.... Courts should be care-
ful not to extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by
reading into them conceptions of public policy that the particular Court
may happen to entertain". 20 In the same case Justice Stone (dissenting)
attempted to give reality to previous decisions by saying that in all those
cases where price fixing had been upheld there had been a breakdown
of the "regulative force of competition" affecting seriously "a large
number of the members of the community". He insisted that a similar
situation existed in this case, and concluded that the solution to the
problem "turns upon considerations of economics about which there may
be reasonable difference of opinion. Choice between these views takes
us from the judicial to the legislative field. The judicial function ends
when it is determined that there is a basis for legislative action in a field
not withheld from legislative power by the Constitution as interpreted
by the decisions of this Court".21
Justice Stone again dissenting in the Ribnik case added another
criticism of the "affected with a public interest" view, saying that he
could not distinguish a difference between "reasonable regulation of
price, if appropriate to the evil to be remedied, and other forms of
appropriate regulation" since either affected the economic return of a
business. 22  Justice Brandeis, dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann,23 was of the opinion that "the notion of a distinct category of
business 'affected with a public interest' employing property devoted to
a public use rests upon historical error ... the true principle is that the
State's power extends to every regulation of any business reasonably
required and appropriate for the public protection".
As a result of their efforts, in 1929 these dissenters seem to have
won a "moral victory" in Tagg Brothers v. Uited States.24 That
decision, written by Justice Brandeis, unanimously upheld the validity
of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture fixing the maximum fees
chargeable by marketing agencies or commission men operating in the
Omaha Stockyards, which order was made pursuant to authority granted
to the Secretary in the Packers and Stockyards Act.25 The Court
simply stated that the commission men enjoyed a substantial monopoly
" Id. at 446, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 41 L. ed. at 729 (1927).
" Id. at 454, 47 Sup. Ct. at 436, 71 L. ed. at 733 (1927).
2'277 U. S. at 373, 48 Sup. Ct. at 552, 72 L. ed. at 923 (1927).
23 285 U. S. at 302, 52 Sup. Ct. at 383, 76 L. ed. at 766 (1931) (a statute mak-
ing a certificate of public necessity and convenience a prerequisite of engaging in
the business of manufacturing and distributing ice was held invalid).
" 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup. Ct. 220, 74 L. ed. 524 (1930).
" Act of Aug. 15, 1921, c. 64, §§301-16, 42 Stat. 159, 163-68, 7 U. S. C.
§§201-17 (1926).
1941]
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and performed an indispensable service in the interstate commerce in
livestock, and left undiscussed the question of whether or not the busi-
ness was "affected with a public interest", even though they could have
decided the case on this basis. The Court appeared ready to give the
phrase "affected with a public interest" a well-earned rest. However,
it was not until 1934 that the Court, in Nebbid v. New York,20 finally
overthrow in toto the idea that price control legislation could act only
on businesses "affected with a public interest". This decision involved
a statute giving a milk control board power to fix minimum prices for
milk, and was based on the legislative finding that an emergency existed
due to the oversupply of raw milk; therefore, the control of price
through the law of supply and demand was no longer effective. More-
over, the circumstances were such that if the Court had desired to do
so they could have upheld the statute either on the authority of the
emergency rent cases or by declaring the milk industry "affected with a
public interest", since competition had failed to fix a fair price and the
industry was of vast public importance. Instead of this, the majority
chose to abandon the laissez-faire idea that price regulatiorn would be
permitted only in those exceptional cases in which the Court found the
business or industry "affected with a public interest". The arguments
used in upholding the statute were those which had previously appeared
only in dissenting opinions and the conclusion reached was that the
phrase "affected with a public interest" meant only that the business so
described was, for adequate reasons, subject to control for the public
good. Commenting at the time on the decision, James E. Beck declared
that the Court had "calmly discarded its decisions of fifty years" with-
out even paying "those decisions the obsequious respect of a final
oration".2 7.
That the Supreme Court had abandoned the old method of reviewing
price regulations should have been apparent to all in the Nebbia case. In
subsequent decisions the Court has followed the new approach in ap-
proving fair trade acts (which are analagous in requiring dealers to
observe minimum resale prices fixed in contracts to which they were not
parties),28 Federal milk price fixing,29 minimum wages, 30 and state reg-
ulation of tobacco warehouse charges.31 However, in the face of these
26291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940 (1934).
" Cong. Rec., March 24, 1934, at 5480.
28 Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp. 299 U. S. 183,
57 Sup. Ct. 139, 81 L. ed. 109 (1936).
" United'States v. Rock Royal Co6p., 307 U. S. 533, 59 Sup. Ct. 993, 83
L. ed. 1446 (1939).
"o West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. ed.
703 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Childrens' Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43. Sup.
Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785 (1923), which had declared unconstitutional a minimum
wage statute applied to women).
" Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441, 57 Sup. Ct. 842, 81 L. ed. 1210
88 [Vol. 20
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decisions some authorities persisted in clinging to the old view. This
attitude appeared in the decision in the state court in the instant case.
3 2
The effect of the decision of the Supreme Court should be to make it
plain that its attitude in the Nebbia case is now its settled policy; that
hereafter price legislation need be justified by no special circumstances
under the label "affected with a public interest" or otherwise. This
decision is in line with recent trends toward a controlled economy, and
obviously makes it possible for governmental action to supplant free
competition as our principal means of determining prices. The new
approach will eliminate judicial legislation as to which businesses are
suitable for price control; yet by treating price fixing as an ordinary
exercise of the police power, a check against capricious and arbitrary
legislation will be preserved. JAMEs F. LAWRENCE, JR.
Contempt of Court-Construction of Federal Statute Concerning
Punishment for Contempt
In the case of Nye v. United States,' the Supreme Court, by con-
struction of section 268 of the judicial code, 2 has stringently abridged
the power of the federal district courts3 to punish summarily for
contempt.
4
(1937); Mayo v. 14keland Highlands Canning Co., Inc., 309 U. S. 310, 60 Sup.
Ct. 517, 84 L. ed. 481 (1940) (a preliminary injunction was denied against en-
forcement of a statute fixing prices of citrus juices in the citrus fruit industry).
State price regulation has been upheld in the following cases: Highland Farms
Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608, 57 Sup. Ct. 549, 81 L. ed. 835 (1937);
Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251, 56 Sup. Ct. 453, 80
L. ed. 669 (1936); Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163, 55 Sup.
Ct. 7, 79 L. ed. 259 (1934) ; cf. Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S.
266, 56 Sup. Ct. 457, 80 L. ed. 675 (1936) (the court held unreasonable and arbi-
trary a classification created by a N. Y. statute which limited the benefit of a
price differential to milk dealers not having a well-advertised trade name to those
who were already engaged in the milk business at a certain date).
'2 State v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 574, 293 S. W. 393 (1940).
'Nye v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 733 (1941), Note
(1941) 54 HARv. L. Rav. 1397. Followed in Millinocket Theatre v. Kurston, 39
F. Supp. 979 (D. Me., 1941). Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F. (2d) 642 (App. D. C.
1941) (retroactive operation of Nye decision).
236 Stat. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §385 (1928) ("The said courts shall
have the power to impose and administer all necessary oaths, and to punish,
by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, contempts of their
authority. Such power to punish contempts shall- not be construed to extend
to any cases except the misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of
the officers of said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or re-
sistance by any such officer, or by any party, juror, witness, or other person
to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts").
I As to bankruptcy proceedings, see Boyd v. Glucklick, 116 Fed. 131 (D.
Iowa, 1902). As to disobedience of an injunction outside the district, see Myers
v. United States, 264 U. S. 95, 44 Sup. Ct. 272, 62 L. ed. 577 (D. C. W. D.
Mo., 1924).
'This note will not deal with the constitutionality of the statute. The power
1941]
